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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 APR 1948

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Attention:

Acting Chief

Estimates Group, ORE

SUBJECT: Comments on "The Current Situation in the Free Territory of Trieste" (ORE 23-48)

Inasmuch as subject paper is entirely political and contains no primary air intelligence, the Director of Intelligence, USAF concurs without comment.

1 Incl:
 Memo frm CIA
 dtd 6 Apr w/
 l Incl w/d

JAMES F. OLIVE, JR.

Colonel, U.S.A.F.

Chief, Air Intelligence Division DI/USAF Liaison Representative to Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP78-01617A003100180004-4

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WAR DEPARTMENT WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

185258

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CSGID 092

1 4 APR **1948**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, ESTIMATES GROUP, ORE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Current Situation in the Free Territory of Trieste (ORE 23-48).

The Intelligence Division desires that the following dissent be published with the paper:

"The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army dissents with the paper as written. The assumption is implicit throughout the text, and partly expressed on page 1, that the whole international dispute over Trieste has been and is a question only of prestige between East and West. The intrinsic importance of Trieste as a strategic military asset to its possessor is ignored.

This division believes that, while the strategic importance of the Trieste area should not be overemphasized, it must, nevertheless, be taken into account as a material factor in the struggle between East and West for control of the area. In any Soviet-Yugoslav military operation into northern Italy, advance use of the excellent port facilities and superior communications with the Danubian valley afforded by physical possession of the city of Trieste, together with the terrain advantages, would make it possible to assemble a large force with good logistic support as well as to make naval preparations in the Adriatic to a much greater extent than would be possible with the present demarkation line or the present frontier. These advantages would enable the Eastern bloc to accelerate its overrunning of northern Italy and its eventual control of the entire Italian peninsula, to the detriment of any planned counteraction by the western countries.

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Short of war, possession of Trieste would give the Eastern bloc an opportunity to intensify pressure on Italy in the same proportion as the enhanced military capabilities described above."

cast, G. S. C.

Dogwood Director of Intelligence

STAT

In reply refer to Initials op32-FN

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25, D. C.





8 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PAUL A. BOREL, CIA:

Subj:

ORE 23-48 - The Current Situation in the

Free Territory of Trieste.

The Office of Naval Intelligence concurs in subject paper.

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON



April 9, 1948

STAT

MEMORA NDUM

To:

Acting Chief, Estimates Group, ORE

Central Intelligence Agency

Subject:

CIA Estimate on Trieste (ORE 23-48)

The Intelligence organization of the Department of State concurs in the subject report, as amended as a result of conversations (ORE-OIR).

MERRITT B. BOOTH